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and
v. NORTHCOMPANY
Corporation), Cross; NORWICH UNION FIRE
INSURANCE SOCIETY
Corporation), Appellant;
S'l'. PAUL l\LEJROUllY INDE:M:NI'l'Y OOJVIPANY (a
et
Cross-defendants and Respondents.
Contract- Formation: Premiums- Payment.-notified an insurance agent from
liability policy that it was going
which it did, but the agent,
had the insurer issue a new policy
refused to accept, and where, long after the
accidPnt
the carrier's truck and settlement of
claim by another insurer, the agent
the
which it paid, there
was no basis
under such
Id.-Contract--Formation.-There is no insurance contract
or unknown event to be insured against
insured and insurer when the premium
was
§§ 22, 250.)

!d.-Contract--Certificate of Insurer as Contract.-Noticc
filed by an insurer vdth the state Public Utilities Commission
that it had insured a
carrier for the period in ques-

ereating a contract of insurance
of the public was in-

Tnsurancc,
McK. Dig, References:
§ 37;

~~
flSlll""fi<'P

§ 333.

HO,

fllSUI'Hfle(',
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[47 C.2d
was liable because
two were to pay any loss over and
above that covered
other
and where a judgment
the insurer found liable must
reversed for insuffiof the evidence to show that it had insured plaintiff
and
alone
the basis for the judgment exonerating
the other insurers
and
the
retrial would
be which of those two
the whole loss or some
the
in their favor
must be reversPd
was taken therefrom.

APPEAL from a
of the
Court of the
City and County of San F'raneisco. Thomas M. Foley, Judge.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Action by highway carrier against two public liability insurers in which defendants filed cross-complaints against two
other insurers. Judgment for cross-defendant Royal Indemnity Company affirmed; remaining portion of judgment
for plaintiff against one liability insurer and in favor of other
insurer and other cross-defendant, reversed.
Foley, Branson & Limpert and Francis N. Foley for Appellant.
Edward A. Friend for Plaintiff and Respondent and for
Cross-defendant and Respondent St. Paul Mercury Indemnity
Co.
Millington & Dell 'Ergo, Wayne R. Millington and Robert
J. Dell 'Ergo for Cross-complainant and Respondent.
Keith, Creede & Sedgwick and Frank J. Creede for Crossdefendant and Respondent Royal Indemnity Co.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff, a highway common carrier, commenced an aetion alleging that one of his trucks was involved
in an accident on June 5, 1951, in which two persons named
Kuhwarth were killed; that at that time there were in effect,
e.overing his truck, policies of public liability insurance issued
by Northwest Casualty Company, Nonvieh Union Fire Insuranee Society, Ltd. and St. Paul Mereury Indemnity Company; that the Kuhwarths' representatives eommcnced aetions
against him >rhieh he settled by paying a total of $6,600; that
St. Paul i~-; willing to pay one-third of 1he amount. Only
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were answered;
presented
was also answered. The issues as
the
of which of: the four insurance companies
was liable for the settlement with Kuhwarths' representatives
what portion each should bear. It is conceded that Royal
had no
policy covering plaintiff; judgment was
in its favor, and no contention is made here for reversal.
The court rendered judgment concluding that plaintiff
was insured with Norwich and it must pay all of the settlement because, although plaintiff also had insurance with
Northwest and St. Paul, those policies had "other insurance"
provisions under which they were not liable except to the
extent that the claim exceeded the coverage offered by the
Norwich policy which contained no such "other insurance"
clause. Judgment was accordingly entered that plaintiff recover the $6,600 from Norwich and for St. Paul against
Northwest and Norwich for costs; that Northwest recover its
costs of "defending the Complaint." Norwich, alone, appeals from the judgment, asserting the evidence is insufficient
to support the judgment that it had an insurance contract
with plaintiff and in any case plaintiff had no interest in the
controversy because St. Paul rather tl1an plaintiff had paid
the $6,600 Kuhwarth settlement.
It is undisputed that the Kuhwarth settlement was fair
and reasonable. St. Paul alone defended plaintiff in the
actions and negotiated the settlement. The policy of each of
the three insurers, Norwich, Northwest and St. Paul, is in an
amount more than sufficient to pay the settlement. The court
found that all three insurance companies were notified of the
Kuhwarth accident. ·when the Kuhwarth settlement was
made, St. Paul paid plaintiff the amount thereof and plaintiff obtained a cashier's check for the balance which was paid
to the Kuhwarths' representatives, and a loan agreement was
made between St. Paul and plaintiff under which plaintiff
was to pay the $6,600 if and when he recovered it from the
other alleged insurers.
NorwiCh asserts that there was no evidence that there was
an insurance contract between it and plaintiff because the
policy was not delivered to plaintiff nor accepted by him; that
there was no meeting of minds. Plaintiff testified that at the
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an agent other than
of the accident to any
whom he handed the papers
actions.
The uncontradicted
manager of Williams Insurance
Is
in harmony with plaintiff's
and shows that vYilliams
had been handling
automobile insurance and had
placed a Northwest policy for him which
1951; that although
were told
1st that he was placing his insurance
no request for insurance from
and Northwest policies
ness. When the Norwich
deliver it to plaintiff and to his bank which held
his equipment but both refused the
he had obtained insurance elsewhere;
deliver the policy
returned
Plaintiff does not
th]s
tention to the following facts in the
Iiams' request Norwich issued, that
to plaintiff to run from June 1,
to June 1,
sent it to vVilliams; it also filed a notice with the state Public
Utilities Commission that as
the Public Utilities
Code, it had insured plaintiff for the
question.
Norwich cancelled the policy in June after the
and
on June 7, 1951, so advised the Public Utilities Commission,
to be effective on June 26, 1951. On
vYilliams
sent a bill to plaintiff on a Norwich form for premium for
the policy from ,June 1, 1951 to ,June
and plaintiff
paid the bill.
[1] Accepting this undisputed
there is no basiP
for liability under the Norwich
where
was
paid long after the loss (the accident) and St. Paul was negotiating a settlement of the claim arising out of the accident.
It is said in Hargett v. Gulf Ins. Co., 12 Cal.App.2d 449, 457
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which fact does
had already
upon the doctrine
this comafter the de-

insurance." It is said in Commercial
Cas.
22 Tenn.App. 656 [125
"It appears that a policy covering this
the Columbia Casualty Insurance
unsatisfactory as to whether
company, but the evidence
the accident or afterwards. But whether
it was issued
a
was
is not material in this case, as the
evidence is uncontroverted that Carter did not apply for the
had
its
never accepted it;
the Commercial Casualty Insurance
had not cancelled; and that he
the issuance of the policy in the Columbia
the accident. There was, therefore,
Carter and the Columbia Casualty Comwas issued dated September 26, 1928.
of insurance is purely a personal contract
between the insured and the insurance company. 32 C.J.
14 H.C.h
§ 535; John Weis, Inc. v. Notie
90
S.W.2d 677, 6821 ; Hackney Co.
421.

fire policy from one
a substitute for
completed conwhere sueh assent
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NoRTHWEST CASUALTY Co.

not bound. Waterloo Lttmber Co.
158 Iowa
138 N.W. 504, 51
In
Byrne v. Prudential Ins. Co.
(Mo.) 88 S.W.2d
344,
the court said: "While a contract of insurance 'has
some features which distinguish it from an ordinary commercial contract,
in
it is like any other
contract and is governed
the same rules.' 32 C.J. p. 1091.
It is as essential to the
of a contract of insurance
as it is to any other contract that there be 'an agreement, or
meeting of the minds of the
thereto. 32 c..J. p. 1095.
Here the action is based upon an alleged contract between
Schockley and the defendant insurance company. The application is a request or proposal for insurance and also supplies the insurance company with the information necessary to
enable it to pass upon the application. An acceptance by the
company and the issuance and delivery of its policy of insurance in reliance upon and in conformity with the application completes the contract. Admittedly Schockley did
not make out or sign the application, was not present at the
time, nor was it shown that he ever consented to the issuance
of the policy of insurance on his life and in his name or had
knowledge thereof. Absent any evidence tending to show
that either before or at the time he consented to the taking
of the insurance in his name or subsequent to the making of
the application or issuance of the policy had knowledge thereof
and either specifically or impliedly ratified same it seems to
follow, in such situation, as a matter of law, that no contract
was entered into or existed between Schockley and the insurance company." (See Hicks v. Hicklin, 187 S.C. 355 [197
S.E. 390] ; Hicklin v. State Farm Mnt. Automobile Ins. Co.,
176 S.C. 504 [180 S.E. 666]; Mallard v. Hardwa1·e Indem.
Ins. Co., (Tex.Civ.App.) 216 S.W.2d 263.) [2] Clearly,
under plaintiff's theory there would not be an insurance contract, under the facts here presented, because the contingency
was known to both plaintiff and Norwich when the premium
was paid. ''Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes
to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising
from a contingent or unknown event." (Ins. Code, § 22.)
"Except as provided in this article any contingent or unknown event, whether past or future, which may damnify a
person having an insurable interest, or create a liability
against him, may be insured against, subject to the provisions
of this code." (Id., § 250.) 'rhe exceptions refer to lotteries,
gaming and wagering (id., §§ 251-252). [3] The notice to
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Utilities Commission did not have the effect of
a contract of insurance between the
here inwe are not concerned with a member of the public.
Heference is made to a letter written by counsel for Noron June
1952. That is of no
for even though
stated that notice was
to the Public Utilities ComNorwich, it also stated that Norwich had issued
to
but it was "collaborating" with St.
which was plaintiil''s insurer
Cases such as Hill v. Industrial Ace. Com., 10 Cal.App.2d
178 [51 P.2d 1126), cited by plaintiff concerning the effect
of the sending of a policy by the company to its agent and
the payment of premium did not involve a situation such
as we have here where plaintiff never ordered any insurance,
informed the insurance agent he did not want any insurance
and the payment of premium was made long after the loss and
another insurer was actively handling the case for the insured.
[4] Inasmuch as the judgment against Norwich must be
reversed for insufficiency of the evidence to show that it had
insured plaintiff and only Norwich appeals, the question arises
as to the disposition or effect on the remainder of the judgment. As heretofore stated the court found that plaintiff
was insured by Norwich, Nor·thwest and St. Paul but that only
Norwich was liable because the policies of Northwest and St.
Paul were to pay any loss over and above that covered by
other insurance. 1 Since by reason of the reversal as to Norwich there is not other insurance insofar as Norwich would
be the other insurance carrier, the basis for the judgment
exonerating Northwest and St. Paul falls. This would mean
that the question on retrial would be, which was liable of
those two for the whole loss or some portion thereo£. 2 It
must therefore follow that the portion of the judgment in
favor of Northwest and St. Paul will have to be reversed
even though plaintiff did not appeal, because the legal basis
for such judgment is gone by the reversal. The judgment
as to them on that basis is so interwoven and dependent on
1
N orthwest 's policy says if there is other valid insurance the policy
shall be void, except to the extent the limits of the policy are in excess
of the limits in the other insurance in which case the excess is covered.
St. Paul's policy says no insuring agreement thereof shall apply to any
loss if the insured has other insurance except as respects any excess
beyond the amount which would have been payable under the other
insurance.
2
This is assuming that no better case could be made than has been
made to show plaintiff was insured with Norwich.

Hence a reYersal, which
nrcessary,
to St. Paul's and Nortlnvcst 's
finding above mentioned that
carried insurance for
tiff. Thus it follows that the who1c matter is thrown open to
reascertainment on retrial.
It may be mentioned that the evidence is
msufficient to show that Northwest insured plaintiff because
it is substantially the same as that with
to Norwich
but that is a matter which may be determined on retrial. It
is unnecessary to consider Norwich's
that plaintiff
does not have a standing to sue because of its claim that he
whereby
was paid by St. Paul and the "loan"
plaintiff agreed to repay the settlement
to St. Paul
if it recovered from the other
a true loan.
Since the judgment must be reversed the matter is one subject for determination on a retrial, and in this connection it
should be observed that aJl the parties are before the court
for a determination of the amount if any to he horne by each
insurer. (See Fidelity etc. Co. v. Fit·eman's F. I. Co., 38
Cal.App.2d 1 [100 P.2c1 364]; diseussion and cases colleeted,
5 Stan.L.Rev. 147.)
The judgment in favor of the
Company is
affirmed. The
is reversed.

Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,J.,
J., and McComb, .T., coneurred.
The petition of
Mercury Indemnity
31, 1956.

Spence,
a11d St. Paul
vYas drnird October

